Recent evidence suggests that infants as young as 12 month of age use pointing to communicate about absent entities. The tacit assumption underlying these studies is that infants do so based on tracking what their interlocutor experienced in a previous shared interaction. The present study addresses this assumption empirically. In three experiments, 12-month-old infants could request additional desired objects by pointing to the location in which these objects were previously located. We systematically varied whether the adult from whom infants were requesting had previously experienced the former content of the location with the infant. Infants systematically adjusted their pointing to the now empty location to what they experienced with the adult previously. These results suggest that infants' ability to communicate about absent referents is based on an incipient form of common ground.
Introduction
Language is inherently ambiguous. When interpreting others' utterances, it is not sufficient to focus on what is said, but one also needs to consider the context in which something is said. A crucial aspect of context is the common ground shared between speaker and listener (Bohn & Köymen, 2017; Clark, 1996; Sperber & Wilson, 2001; Tomasello, 2008) . Part of the common ground between two individuals is what they mutually know about a certain state of affairs. As an example for how common ground can be used to disambiguate utterances consider the following: A speaker may communicate to a listener that she desires another piece of cake by pointing to an empty plate if it is part of common ground that this plate previously contained pieces of cake. For a person not sharing this common ground, the point to the empty plate would fail to denote the absent cake. To use common ground, speakers and listeners therefore have to keep track of what they experience with whom. Utterances produced and interpreted in light of common ground quickly lose their ambiguity.
Common ground is not only vital for adult communication, but arguably even more so for young children in the process of learning language. This is for at least two reasons: On the one hand, children's earliest forms of intentional communication (e.g. pointing gestures or one-word utterances) are considerably more ambiguous compared to fully formed adult speech. Successful communication based on these signals heavily relies on common ground. By considering whether something is part of common ground, children can actively help their partner figure out what they mean. On the other hand, when on the receiving end, children are faced with more ambiguity compared to an adult listener because oftentimes they do not know the conventional meaning of words. Again, considering common ground when interpreting utterances greatly facilitates disambiguation and learning. For example, when engaged with someone in naming things by their color, the novel word "zeleny" most likely refers to yet another object's color instead of e.g. its name. In this spirit, a number of theoretical accounts have emphasized the importance of common ground for early communication and language acquisition (Bohn & Köymen, 2017; Bruner, 1974; Clark, 2015; Tomasello, 2008; Tomasello, Carpenter, & Liszkowski, 2007) .
From a psychological perspective, common ground is traditionally conceptualized as involving recursive mindreading on both ends: Speaker and listener reason about each other's mental states to determine what is part of common ground and what not. If recursive mindreading was a pre-requisite for using common ground, it would be unlikely that infants are able to do so because these abilities do not emerge until around six years of age (Miller, 2009 
